Application of doctrine of promissory estoppel against State #indianlaws

 A party acting in reliance on a promise made by the Government if has altered his position, is entitled to enforce the promise against the Government, even though the promise is not in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 and that article does not militate against the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government.

The present matter namely Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. ((1979) 2 SCC 409 = AIR 1979 SC 621), decided on 12.12.1978, raised a question of considerable importance before the Apex Court i.e. how far and to what extent is the State bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel?

It was observed that if the acts or omissions of the officers of the Government are within the scope of their authority and are not otherwise impermissible under the law, they “will work estoppel against the Government”. In India the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been adopted in its fullness and has also been recognised as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived.

A party acting in reliance on a promise made by the Government if has altered his position, is entitled to enforce the promise against the Government, even though the promise is not in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 and that article does not militate against the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government.

In other words it can be concluded that where Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, however high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the former is equally bound as the latter.

Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and the promise would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. The law cannot acquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unless it accords with the moral values of the society and the constant endeavour of the courts and the legislatures must, therefore, to be close the gap between law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a significant judicial contribution in that direction. But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that, having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not arise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that, in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it.

If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability; the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promise a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is also applicable against a public authority like a municipal council.

Thus, in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is necessary for the promisee to show that the suffered detriment as a result of acting in reliance on the promise, but if by detriment it is meant injustice to the promisee which would result, if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promise, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise.