Earlier decision of the coordinate bench binding upon any later coordinate bench deciding same or similar issues #Indianlaws

Precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of Justice and it has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of the same Court and of the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court in the case namely, Tribhuvandas Purshottamdas Thakur vs. Ratilal Motilal Patel, decided on 05.09.1967 and reported as MANU/SC/0345/1967 = 1968(70)BOMLR73 = [1968]1SCR455 dealt with certain questions of fundamental importance in the administration of justice, as were observed, viz., (1) that even though there is a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of which he is a member or of a Division Bench of that High Court, he is not bound to follow that precedent, because by following the precedent the Judge would act contrary to Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, and would also violate the oath of office taken by him when entering upon his duties as a Judge under the Constitution; and (2) that a judgment of a Full Bench of the Court may be ignored by a Single Judge, if the Full Bench judgment is given of a reference made on a question of law arising in a matter before a single Judge or a Division Bench. Such a judgment would “not be a judgment at all” and “has no existence in law”.

The above observations, as noted, subvert the accepted notions about the force or precedents in the country’s system of judicial administration. It was viewed that precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of Justice and it has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason of the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law.

A reference was made to the case of Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey and Ors. MANU/SC/0371/1961 = [1962]2SCR558 holding that if decisions of the same or a superior Court are ignored, even though directly applicable, by a Judge in deciding a case arising before him, on the view that every Judge is entitled to take such view as he chooses of the question of law arising before him, the “law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions”.

In considering whether a precedent of a Court of coordinate authority is binding reference to Section 165 of the Evidence Act is irrelevant. Every Judgment must be based upon facts declared by the Evidence Act to be relevant and duly proved. But when a Judge in deciding a case follows a precedent, he only regards himself bound by the principle underlying the judgment and not by the facts of that case.

The above named Tribhuvandas case was also recently referred by the Apex Court in the case of Sant Lal Gupta and Ors. vs. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and Ors., Civil Appeal No. 9439 of 2003, decided on 18.10.2010 and reported as MANU/SC/0859/2010 = (2010)13SCC336. It was held in this case that it is neither desirable nor permissible by the coordinate Bench to disapprove the earlier judgment and take view contrary to it. A coordinate bench cannot comment upon the discretion exercised or judgment rendered by another coordinate bench of the same court. The rule of precedent is binding for the reason that there is a desire to secure uniformity and certainty in law.

A bench must follow the decision of a coordinate bench and take the same view as has been taken earlier. The earlier decision of the coordinate bench is binding upon any latter coordinate bench deciding the same or similar issues. If the latter bench wants to take a different view than that taken by the earlier bench, the proper course is for it to refer the matter to a larger bench. It was observed as settled proposition of law that what cannot be done directly, is not permissible to be done obliquely, meaning thereby, whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance.